We examine a protocol π beacon that outputs unpredictable and publicly verifiable randomness, meaning that the output is unknown at the time that π beacon starts, yet everyone can verify that the output is close to uniform after π beacon terminates. We show that π beacon can be instantiated via Bitcoin under sensible assumptions; in particular we consider an adversary with an arbitrarily large initial budget who may not operate at a loss indefinitely. In case the adversary has an infinite budget, we provide an impossibility result that stems from the similarity between the Bitcoin model and Santha-Vazirani sources. We also give a hybrid protocol that combines trusted parties and a Bitcoin-based beacon.
Introduction
Consider multiple parties who wish to execute a high stake protocol that involves public randomness. For example, the parties may wish to elect one of them as a leader, in a way that allows anyone (including non-participants in the protocol) to verify that the elected leader did not corrupt the election process by offering bribes to other parties. If the source of the randomness can be tampered with, corrupt parties may try to influence this source in their favor. Due to the high stakes, rational parties may also try to influence the randomness source, even if it is costly to them in the case that they fail.
A reliable source of publicly-verifiable randomness is useful as a basis for many cryptographic primitives. For instance, the design of the SHA256 hash function specifies operations such as y ← (x rotr 6)⊕(x rotr 11)⊕(x rotr 25), where rotr is a circular shift right instruction. Moreover, SHA256 specifies some particular 2048 bits for round constants, as well as some particular 256 bits for an initial state. To increase the public confidence in the scheme, these 2048+ 256 = 2304 bits were derived by invoking simple functions on a series of small prime numbers, since the SHA256 designers claim that other choices for these 2304 bits would be just as good. Still, there exists the possibility that SHA256 has a backdoor (cf. [13] ) that was conjured by first picking the 2304 bits for the round constants and the initial state, and then computing constants for the SHA256 algorithm (such as 6, 11, 25 above) that enable the backdoor. It is of course possible to outsource the selection of these 2304 bits to a trusted party, but the question of how to publicly verify that the SHA256 designers and the trusted party did not collude remains unanswered. If the SHA256 designers could publish the algorithm and define the 2304 bits to be the unpreditable bits that a public beacon has yet to produce, the confidence in SHA256 might be even higher.
To take a more rigorous example, one may consider a provably secure (albeit less efficient) algebraic hash function of the form H(x, y) = g x h y . Finding a collision H(x 1 , y 1 ) = H(x 2 , y 2 ) * Research partly supported by ERC project CODAMODA.
is equivalent to breaking a discrete-log hardness assumption (cf. [39] and [50, Lecture 4] ). For this to hold, g and h should be selected as random elements, i.e., without knowing a number n such that g n = h. In groups that are of interest it is easy to sample random elements by tossing public coins (see for example [5, Section 3.3.4] ), and hence the unpreditable bits that a public beacon produces can be used to define the element h.
On the other hand, a public beacon is unhelpful in the case of cryptographic primitives that rely on a structured common reference string (CRS), because private randomness is needed in order to produce the secrets that the structured CRS is comprised of (cf. [28, 8] ). Thus, for a protocol that requires a CRS of the form, say, s = (g x , g y , g xy ), a trusted party can use her private randomness to sample x, y and compute s, while a public beacon can sample g x , g y but will not be able to output s (if computational Diffie-Hellman [23, 15] is intractable). To give some concrete examples, the Zerocash cryptocurrency [18] and other constructions that are based on linear PCPs [31, 14] cannot utilize a public beacon. Many other NIZK constructions require a structured CRS, for example [29] . Protocols that sample a structured CRS (e.g., [10] ) are not publicly verifiable, and may become increasingly susceptible to aborts (a.k.a. denial of service) in conjunction with the number of parties that execute the sampling algorithm. Additionally, let us remark that when the stakes are high the standard definitions do not necessarily capture a real-world setting. For instance, consider n parties that execute n or fewer invocations of a protocol with identifiable aborts [32] , until an invocation terminates with no aborts by any of the remaining parties. If at least one party is honest then she always contributes her input (i.e., private randomness) to the structured CRS and then destroys her input. However, a single party who remains alone in the final invocation is then more likely to become corrupt (e.g., she could be pressured by the other corrupt parties, or she might be willing to be bribed).
A good randomness source can be useful for an individual user too. Since it is difficult to operate in a completely secure environment, the personal computer of a user could be infected with malware. If the user wishes to run a sensitive process that depends on randomness, she may be concerned about the possibility that malware would interact with this process and feed it non-random bits. Hence, if the process can run a verification algorithm that ensures that the bits originated from a reliable randomness source, the prospects of a successful attack are diminished.
One possible method for obtaining unpreditable random bits is to use financial data [19] . For example, we can derive the output from the least significant bits (LSBs) of the end-of-day price of some particular assets that are traded on a stock exchange. However, it is problematic to formalize the assumptions and quantify the security that this protocol achieves. If the stakes are high enough then it might for example be possible to bribe a person who controls the display of the stock prices, so that she would tweak the LSBs of the end-of-day price of the particular assets. Furthermore, attempting to amplify the security of this protocol is nontrivial: if we wish to derive the beacon output from two distant stock exchanges (say NYSE and SEHK), then a person who controls the display in one stock exchange can wait and see the prices of the other exchange, and then modify the LSBs in the stock exchange that she controls accordingly.
An alternative approach is the NIST beacon [1, 43] , though it relies on a trusted party.
In this work we explore whether the Bitcoin model [41, 27] is a reliable source of public randomness. Clearly, in the absence of an attacker, the entropy that is used to generate fresh secret keys and the assumption that the Proof of Work hash resembles a random oracle imply that plenty of random bits can be extracted from the Bitcoin ledger. In the presence of an attacker, our results can be summarized as follows:
1. If the attacker has p fraction of the Bitcoin mining power and she is able to generate Bitcoin blocks at a loss, indefinitely, then it is impossible to extract from the Bitcoin ledger a single bit whose statistical distance from random is smaller than 1 12 · p. 2. Assuming that the attacker has a limited budget that prevents her from generating blocks at a loss for too long, it is possible to extract bits from the Bitcoin ledger with statistical distance from random that is arbitrarily close to 0.
For the sake of comparison, consider a weak adversary who never attempts to fork the blockchain. Thus, in this setting, our negative result shows that any beacon protocol is susceptible to bias that is at most 6 times smaller than the bias of a trivial protocol that extracts the output from a single predetermined block. This is because the trivial protocol can simply hope that the honest miners created the predetermined block, and thereby achieve 1 2 p or smaller statistical distance from random (an adversary who "resets" once achieves [47, 45] exhibit a similar behavior, and we make use of generalized Santha-Vazirani sources [6] to derive our lower bound.
In case the attacker has less than 1 /2 of the mining power and her budget is small enough, our positive results require n = O(
ǫ ) Bitcoin blocks to obtain a bit whose statistical distance from random is at most ǫ. For adversaries with large budgets, our protocols may require an even larger n. To compare, the lower bound [20] and upper bound [40] on a two-party coin-flipping protocol have Θ( 1 ǫ ) rounds for output with ǫ bias. Similar upper bounds exist for multiparty coin-flipping protocols in the case that at most 2 /3 of the parties are corrupt [7, 30] , and the best known protocols when more than 2 /3 of the parties are corrupt require Ω( 1 ǫ 2 ) rounds for output with ǫ bias [20, 7] . The comparison between blocks and rounds has some sense to it, because both a Bitcoin block and a round of interaction in a multiparty protocol require propagation of messages on a network. However, in other regards these two notions are incomparable. On the one hand, a Bitcoin block requires a significantly longer time (10 minutes on average) than a typical round of interaction. On the other hand, fetching the Bitcoin block can be done by a party who does not even participate in the protocol.
The last remark alludes to the main advantage of Bitcoin-based randomness extraction protocols: unpredictable yet publicly verifiable random bits. In fact, the public verifiability aspect of the beacon has two advantages that are closely related. First, it enables incorruptible protocols by removing any element of trust in the parties who initiated the system. Second, it allows everyone, including new parties who have just begun their participation, to be in agreement on the output of the beacon. Indeed, our results in Section 4 show that all parties reach consensus on the output that the beacon generates.
Related works
The idea of using Bitcoin as a public randomness source has been explored in [2] and [16] . The work of [44] presents negative results with regard to Bitcoin-based randomness extraction in the presence of unrestricted and budget-restricted adversaries. However, [44] considers protocols that extract the output from only a single Bitcoin block, unlike our positive results in Section 4. Also, our lower bound in Section 3 applies to protocols that can use an arbitrary function of all blocks witnessed as the outputted randomness, and considers a weak adversary who may not fork the chain, so in this sense our lower bound is more general than the lower bound of [44] .
Organization of the paper
The contributions of this work are organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide some wellknown definitions and tools. In Section 3 we prove that no protocol can achieve an arbitrarily 3 small bias when the adversary has an infinite budget. In Section 4 we analyse beacon protocols that defeat a budget-restricted adversary, first in a simplified model and then in a model that captures Bitcoin. In Section 4.1 we discuss the rationale for the assumptions that need to be made with regard to budget-restricted adversaries. In Section 5 we describe a protocol that combines a public beacon with reliance of trusted parties. In Section 6 we discuss some realworld considerations that a Bitcoin-based beacon should take into account.
Preliminaries
We denote [n] {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Let Ω denote some finite domain, frequently of the form Ω = Σ n for Σ = [d].
For a subset S ⊆ Ω, we denote µ(S) |S|/|Ω|. We denote by ∆(X, Y ) 1 2 Σ a∈Ω |X(a) − Y (a)| the statistical distance between two distributions X, Y . Note that in case U is the uniform distribution on Ω = {0, 1} and X also has support {0, 1}, it holds that |X(0) −
Definition 2.1 (non-oblivious symbol-fixing sources). A distribution X over Σ n is an (n, k, Σ) non-oblivious symbol-fixing source if there exists a subset
In the special case of Σ = {0, 1}, we say that X is an (n, k) non-oblivious bit-fixing source. Definition 2.2 (extractor for symbol-fixing sources). Let S be a family of (n, k, Σ) symbol-fixing sources. An ǫ-extractor for S is a function ext : Σ n → Σ such that ∀X ∈ S : ∆(ext(X), U ) ≤ ǫ, where U is the uniform distribution on Σ.
The following lemma gives sufficent conditions under which the majority function can act as a randomness extractor. In essence, the lemma shows that the difference between the amount of 0s and 1s among n uniform random bits is concentrated at around √ n, similarly to the expected value of the absolute displacement of a simple random walk.
0 otherwise be the majority function, and let ℓ ǫ π e n − √ n . If n is odd and ǫ ≤ e π then f is an ǫ 2 -extractor for an (n, n − ℓ + 1) non-oblivious bit-fixing source.
Proof. By Stirling's approximation,
. Let E denote the event that f remains undetermined after n − ℓ variables were chosen randomly. Hence,
Assume that ℓ is even. Since n is odd, it holds that Pr(f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 1|¬E) = Pr(
we have that Pr(f = 1|¬E) = Pr(f = 0|¬E) = 1 /2. This implies that f is an ǫ 2 -extractor for an (n, n−ℓ) non-oblivious bit-fixing source, because
If ℓ is odd, the result follows by replacing ℓ with ℓ ′ = ℓ − 1.
Adversaries with an infinite budget
In this section we prove our lower bound. Our proof is inspired by a lower bound on extraction from generalized Santha-Vazirani (SV) sources from Appendix B of Beigi, Etesami and Gohari [6] . We mention that this proof is based, in turn, on an elegant proof of Reingold, Vadhan and Wigderson [45] simplifying the original lower bound of [47] for randomness extraction from SV sources.
The purpose of the next definition is to formally model the distribution of blocks generated when an adversary has control of a p-th fraction of the mining power. We define a relatively weak adversary A. Specifically, A does not have the power to fork the network and try to create alternate chains. The only thing A is able to do is to try to mine the next block himself, and if he succeeds before the honest miners, he can decide whether to publish this block or let the honest miners publish their version of the next block. Furthermore, A must make this decision before seeing the honest miners' version of the next block. Note that one may regard A to be an adversary with an infinite budget, under the interpretation that producing each block has a cost and A can discard block rewards without repercussions. Let us emphasize that since we use this definition for our randomness extraction impossibility result, the weak adversary model makes the result stronger. Indeed, if we assume that all adversaries have an infinite budget, A is weaker than the adversary A 1 of the M FL model (cf. Figure 1 ), yet A 1 is the weakest adversary that we will consider later in our positive results. We proceed to the formal definition. 
n is a p-resettable source, or simply p-resettable, if it can be sampled symbol by symbol by a randomized algorithm A via the following process. For any x 1 , . . . ,
2. With probability 1 − p, X i is set to a. Otherwise, a is given to algorithm A. A can now choose, given access to a and x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , either to set X i = a, or discard a and then choose a new uniform element b ∈ [d] and set X i = b.
We emphasize that A must choose whether to 'reset' X i , i.e. to discard a, before sampling b.
Note that using the definition above also for n = 1, we have that if for every i ∈ [n], and every x 1 , . . . ,
Proof idea: We sketch the idea of the proof, relating it to the proofs of [45] and [6] . [45] show an extraction lower bound for the family of 'slightly imbalanced sources'. These are distributions on [d] n with the property that the ratio of the probabilities given to any two strings in [d] n is close to one. Most of our work will be to show that any slightly imbalanced source is in fact a p-resettable source. This is a similar strategy to [6] , that 'embed' slightly imbalanced sources into generalized SV sources for the purpose of their lower bound. We begin with the definition of a p-perturbed distribution on [d], which will be useful for this purpose.
, we define a quantity u a to measure "how much probability a is given beyond required minimum". Formally, we define
Consider the following sampling procedure.
2. With probability
We claim the distrbution Y sampled by this procedure is a p-resettable source. This is because the "resetting", i.e. outputting b rather than a, always happens with probability at most p, even after conditioning on the value of a. We denote by η the probability that resetting occurred; i.e., the overall probability that the procedure outputs b rather than a, without conditioning on the value of a. We have
We will show that Pr(Y = c) = Pr(X = c); this implies Y ≡ X which means X is a p-resettable source. The event Y = c is a union of the following two disjoint events A and B:
• A: c was output as a in the first stage of the procedure. We have
• B: c was output as b in the resetting stage. Pr(B) is the product of the probability η = p/2 that resetting occurred times 1/d, as given that we are resetting, the output is uniform.
Thus, for any c ∈ [d], we have
Therefore, X is a p-resettable source.
Claim 3.4. Fix 0 < q ≤ 1/3. We have
Theorem 3.5. For any function E : [d] n → {0, 1} and any 0 < p ≤ 1, there is a p-resettable source X such that E(X) has bias at least p/12.
Proof. Fix any function E : [d] n → {0, 1}, and any 0 < p ≤ 1. Assume w.l.o.g. that µ(E −1 (0)) ≥ 1/2, and fix a set S ⊆ E −1 (0) with µ(S) = 1/2 (Here we assumed for simplicity d is even. Otherwise, the proof can be altered). Define a distribution X on [d] n as follows.
• Any x ∈ S has probability (1
It is left to show that X is a p-resettable source. Note that for any set
We know that
Using Claim 3.4 with q = p/6, we have
and therefore p-resettable. It follows that X is a p-resettable source.
Remark 3.6 (Extractors with unbounded input length).
One may wonder whether an extractor that does not have a fixed input length n can get smaller error. However, for any such extractor E and any ǫ > 0, we can take n such that the probability that E produces an output after n symbols is at least 1 − ǫ, and define E ′ to be the extractor that reads n symbols and answers according to E, or answers 0 if E hasn't terminated. (It seems a reasonable assumption that such n exists if E is to be useful). By the lower bound, E ′ has error at least p/12, which implies the error of E is at least p/12 − ǫ. As this holds for any ǫ > 0, the error of E must be at least, say, p/13.
Remark 3.7 (Efficiency of the adversary).
The proof of Theorem 3.5 shows that there exists a p-resettable source that will bias the output of E. One may wonder, if the "adversary can be efficient"; that is, whether the algorithm A from Definition 3.1 -deciding whether to "reset or not", can be efficient. Examination of the proof shows that when E is computable in time poly(n, d); we can construct a p-resettable source X ′ where A will operate in time poly(n, d) and such that E(X ′ ) will have bias at least p/13. We sketch why this is so. Let X be the distribution defined in the beginning of the proof of Theorem 3.5. We assume for simplcity here that Pr(E(x) = 0) = 1/2; otherwise, we must start by approximating this probability and this will add an arbitrarily small error term. We first observe that when E is efficiently computable, the distrbution X can be efficiently sampled: Simply choose random
and discard x and resample with the appropriate probability when E(x) = 1, to give x's with E(x) = 0 the desired larger probability (1 + p/6)/d n . In a similar way, we can efficiently sample distributions of the form (X|X 1 = x 1 , . . . , X i−1 = x i−1 ), by starting with a random x ∈ [d] n with prefix (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 ), rather than a completely uniform x ∈ [d] n . Thus, we can approximate the probabilities η a Pr(X i = a|X 1 = x 1 , . . . , X i−1 = x i−1 ) appearing in the proof. Inspection of the proof of Lemma 3.3 shows these probabilities are all we need to sample X correctly; thus, A can efficiently approximate X.
Beacon for budget-restricted adversaries
It is entirely reasonable to assume that a Bitcoin miner will incur significant losses if she does not claim the rewards for a large portion (such as half) of the blocks that she produces, and hence she will deplete her budget when she employs a strategy of this kind. Still, the beacon protocol needs to establish its correctness in the face of an adversary who wishes to offset such losses by attempting to accumulate profits during certain periods of the protocol execution. With this in mind, let us provide the following abstract assumption.
Assumption 4.1. Let maxprofits : Q × N → Q be a function that is monotonically increasing in both of its arguments. Consider a Bitcoin miner who invested t coins to buy her mining equipment. For any segment of n consecutive blocks of the chain, the amount of coins profit (i.e., revenues minus operating expenses) that this miner will earn as a result of creating some portion of the blocks in this segment is bounded by maxprofits(t, n).
The function maxprofits bounds the profitability of generating blocks. For now, maxprofits can be thought of as satisfying the condition ∀n : maxprofits(t, n) ≤ 2t. See Section 4.1 for a more thorough examination of Assumption 4.1, and in particular Example 4.13 with regard to why Assumption 4.1 is unavoidable.
To explain the main considerations that come into play in a budget-restricted setting, let us first provide a proof in a simplified model M FL , that is specified in Figure 1 . In this model, blockchain forks never occur, and all parties including the adversary create blocks only at the head of the chain. Note that we associate each block with a formal symbol, and so we use the terms "block" and "symbol" interchangeably.
Let us consider a protocol that outputs a single bit. Since we may assume w.l.o.g. that the adversary wishes to bias the output towards 1, and that each block is associated with a symbol that is represented by bits, we define the following notation. Definition 4.2. A "helpful" block is a block such that the symbol that is associated with it has 1 as its least significant bit (LSB). Likewise, a "detrimental" block is a block such that the symbol that is associated with it has LSB that equals 0.
In the following lemma, the parameter δ measures how large the profit margin of the adversary can be. For example, one may think of δ = 2 /3 throughout the analysis. If p is rather small so that p ′ = p /2 1− p /2 ≈ p /2, the profit margin z p = px − y p should be small enough so that
px − y p is a negative number. Even in the case that p is quite 8
Forkless model M FL
The forkless model with parameter p proceeds in turns, as follows:
1. In each turn, the adversary A 1 is successful with probability p and unsuccessful with probability 1 − p.
2. In case A 1 is successful, she receives a uniform random block from the random oracle and can either discard it or extend the head of the chain with it.
3. In case A 1 is unsuccessful, the chain is extended with a uniform random block. large, say p = 1 /5, if we substitute exemplary numbers such as x = 50, y p = 9, z p = 50 /5 − 9 = 1, we get that w p = 3 /2 · 1 /9 · 50 − 9 = −2 /3 < 0. Thus, in the case of δ = 2 /3, the parameter n should be large enough so that p 0 = exp{− Assume that A 1 purchased her p fraction of the mining power with t 1 coins, and that she has a reserve of t 2 additional coins. Denote T (i) t 2 + maxprofits(t 1 , i). Assume that each block reward is x coins, and that each attempt by A 1 to solve the next block costs her at least y p coins. Denote the maximal profit margin of 
If n is taken to be large enough so that T (n) + δ 1 p ′ ℓw p < 0, then this protocol outputs a bit whose statistical distance from a uniform random bit is at most ǫ + p 0 + e π
Proof. The adversary A 1 may opt to increase her t 2 coins reserve by operating as an honest miner in some locations, even though that entails that A 1 would then have less opportunities to influence the output of the beacon in the remaining locations. Assume w.l.o.g. that A 1 wishes to bias the output of the beacon towards 1. Since A 1 only extends the head of the chain, the optimal strategy that she can deploy must be of a form in which A 1 alternates between the following two modes. In the first mode, A 1 operates as an honest miner, meaning that she publishes every block B i that she creates, regardless of whether B i is a "helpful" or "detrimental" block. In the second mode, A 1 inspects the LSB of each block B i that she successfully created, and publishes B i only if it is a "helpful" block, otherwise she discards B i . Suppose for the moment that A 1 never switches to the first mode after she discards a "detrimental" block but before the next turn of M FL . The strategy of A 1 can thus be viewed as adaptively selecting d ≤ n locations in which she plays as an honest miner, and in the other n − d locations A 1 discards all the "detrimental" blocks that she creates. Hence, while operating in the second mode, A 1 will successfully create the block and collect the reward of each location with probability
To decide the outcome of ℓ locations, A 1 needs ℓ successes that occur with probability p ′ each, because a failed trial does not deny the location from having a uniform random symbol. Let Y = Y (ℓ, p ′ ) be a random variable with negative binomial distribution that counts the number of trials until ℓ successes. By using a tail inequality [17, 24] for the binomial distribution B(δ
If the event E 2 {Y ≥ δ 1 p ′ ℓ} occurs then the gains and losses of A 1 until she influences the majority function ℓ times will sum up to S = ℓx + δ
Notice that A 1 's average cost per trial is in fact greater than y p , because each trial may involve several turns. Also note that if the success probability of A 1 was p rather than p ′ then the sum S would be a multiple of 1 δ px − y p > z p and hence positive. Let us refer to the blocks that A 1 created while operating in the second mode as marked blocks, and let E 3 {A 1 contributed at most ℓ marked blocks among B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n }. According to Assumption 4.1, the total amount of coins that A 1 may earn while playing honestly in the d locations is bounded by maxprofits(t 1 , d) ≤ maxprofits(t 1 , n), and hence T (n) represents the maximal budget that A 1 has for playing in the n − d locations. Since we assume that T (n) + S < 0 and A 1 does not go under budget, we have that E 2 ⊆ E 3 holds, because the occurrence of E 2 implies that A 1 stops operating after she played in at most ℓ out of the n − d locations. Note that if δ 1 p ′ ℓ > n − d then the occurrence of E 2 implies that A 1 failed to reach ℓ successes irrespective of her T (n) budget, meaning that E 2 ⊆ E 3 in this case too.
Let E 4 {the amount of marked blocks that A 1 contributed among B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n is at least as large as the difference between "helpful" and "detrimental" blocks among the unmarked blocks of B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n }. Thus, following Lemma 2.3, we have that Pr(E 4 |E 3 ) ≤ ǫ.
Let E 1 {majority(b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n ) = 1}. Since a tie among n − ℓ uniform random bits occurs with probability e π 1 √ n−ℓ at the most (cf. Lemma 2.3), we have Pr(
Now, if A 1 is allowed to switch to the first mode after she discards a "detrimental" block but before the next turn, we can still count such a trial as a loss of y p coins. This means that in case A 1 succeeds to create the next block it will be accounted for as playing honestly in one of the d locations, and therefore the total number of trials can exceed n − d (implying that the success probability in a trial is less than p ′ ). Note that A 1 should never switch from the first mode to the second mode before she succeeds to create a block, since the only purpose of operating in the first mode is to avoid going under budget. Therefore, Pr(E 1 ) ≤ ǫ + Overall, the statistical distance between the output bit and a uniform random bit is at most
The reason why the above protocol can terminate immediately after the n th block has been fetched is that even unintentional forks do not occur in M FL , hence none of the n blocks can be reversed.
Let us now broaden Lemma 4.3 to a model that captures Bitcoin. The model that we employ is the Bitcoin backbone formulation, that was proposed in [27] . In this setting, an adversary with p fraction of the mining power may be able to create more than p fraction of the blocks in expectation, due to adversarial strategies that take advantage of blockchain forks (cf. [25, 48] ). Yet, Assumption 4.1 is reasonable in this model too, per the discussion in Section 4.1.
Overview 4.4. In the framework of [27] , there are N parties (or N miners), and an adversary A is allowed to statically corrupt t of them and use their quota of hashing queries. Hash invocations in [27] are modeled as random oracle queries, and hence the mining power of A is β tqT /2 κ , where q is the quota of queries that a miner has in each round of an execution of the backbone protocol, T is the difficulty target, and κ is the length of the digest. The mining power of the honest miners is α (N − t)qT /2 κ , and γ α 2 − α represents a lower bound on the power of the honest miners after unintentional forks are taken into consideration (see [27, 
In [27] , the adversary A together with the environment Z can orchestrate an attack against the protocol execution in any way feasible, independently of the actual cost that the attack might be worth. Therefore, we augment [27] with the following definitions, that serve as the basis for the interpretations that we will soon provide.
Definition 4.5. Let B B,ℓ,L be a predicate that is parameterized by a block B and lengths ℓ and L. Given a chain C and an adversary A, let C A denote an annotated chain that specifies for each of its blocks whether it was created by A. We say that B B,ℓ,L is a bankruptcy predicate if for any adversary A and for any chain C, it holds that B B,ℓ,L (C A ) = 1 iff C A contains a segment of L consecutive blocks that starts with B, and A created at most ℓ out of these L blocks. Definition 4.6. An execution of the backbone protocol is said to have a bankruptcy event w.r.t. an adversary A and a bankruptcy predicate B B,ℓ,L if it holds that at some round r of the execution, every honest party P adopts a chain C A P for which B B,ℓ,L (C A P ) = 1. Let us clarify that Definition 4.6 does not imply anything about the level of anonymity in the system. That is to say, an honest party does not necessarily know which blocks were created by A, but due to the agreement among all honest parties we have that w.h.p. A will not collect more than ℓ rewards in a segment of L blocks that starts at the block B.
The beacon protocol π beacon is given in Figure 2 . The following Lemma shows that an adversary who discards "detrimental" blocks will either fail to influence π beacon , or become bankrupt while trying. In the denotations of this Lemma, the event E b ∩ ¬E ℓ implies that the adversary continued to operate after she went bankrupt. While the Bitcoin backbone formulation itself does not prevent this possibility, one may consider an extended model in which Pr(E b ∩ ¬E ℓ ) = 0.
Lemma 4.7. Let ǫ > 0, n ≥ 1, k ≥ 1 be arbitrary. Following Overview 4.4, assume that the mining power of the adversary A 2 is β, and that γ = λ(1+δ)β is satisfied for some δ ∈ (0, 1),
Suppose that an honest party invokes the protocol π beacon . Let E b be the bankruptcy event w.r.t. A 2 and the predicate B B 1 ,ℓ,L , and let E ℓ {A 2 contributed at most ℓ of the blocks B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n }. If A 2 never publishes any of the "detrimental" blocks that she creates, then π beacon outputs a bit whose statistical distance from a uniform random bit is ǫ + Pr(E b ∩ ¬E ℓ ) + (Ω( √ n)) −1 + e −Ω(δ 2 ℓ) + e −Ω(k) at the most. Proof. Since A 2 discards all of the "detrimental" blocks that she obtains from the random oracle, she can be regarded as an adversary whose mining power is β ′ = β /2. Thus, for λ ′ = 2λ, the equality γ = λ ′ (1 + δ)β ′ holds. Let E s = {A 2 contributed at least as many blocks among B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n as the difference between "helpful" and "detrimental" blocks that the honest miners contributed among B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n }. We have "s" in E s to indicate that A 2 succeeded to influence the output bit.
Since we defined ℓ with ǫ 2 instead of ǫ, Lemma 2.3 implies that Pr(E s |E ℓ ) ≤ ǫ 2 holds. For the chain of consecutive blocks B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n , . . . that an honest party fetches and thereby derives the output of the protocol, let B m be the ℓ th block that A 2 contributed. In other words, A 2 contributed ℓ of the first m blocks, and the honest miners created the other m − ℓ blocks. Denote E q {m ≥ L}. According to [27, Theorem 10] , the chain quality property entails that Pr(E q ) = 1 − e −Ω(δ 2 m) ≥ 1 − e −Ω(δ 2 ℓ) . In fact, [27, Theorem 10] guarantees an even stronger property, see Remark 4.11. The letter "q" in E q refers to the quality of the segment
Let r denote the round at which the protocol π beacon terminated. Let us define E c {At round r, the block B n is included in every chain of of every honest party}. Due to the common prefix property [27, Theorem 9] , it holds that Pr(E c ) = 1 − e −Ω(k) . We have "c" in E c to indicate that the common prefix B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n is in consensus.
Let us consider two cases. For the first case, we assume that L ≤ n. Here, it holds that ¬E b ∩ E q ⊆ ¬E c , because E q ∩ E c ⊆ E b . The reason that E q ∩ E c ⊆ E b holds is as follows. If E c occurred, then for every honest party P we have that the chain C P,r that P adopted at round r includes B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n . If E q occurred, then for any chain C that contains B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n we have B B 1 ,ℓ,L (C A 2 ) = 1. Hence, if both E q and E c occurred, then at round r every honest party P adopted a chain C P,r such that B B 1 ,ℓ,L (C A 2 P,r ) = 1. This implies that E b occurred. By the law of total of total probability, we obtain
For the second case, we assume that L > n. Here, E q ⊆ E ℓ . Therefore,
Thus, the second case implies an even smaller bound on Pr(¬E b ∩ E s ). Let E 0 {majority(b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n ) = 0}. Since ¬E s implies that more than half of the bits b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n are uniform random, and since a tie among n /2 uniform random bits occurs with probability . Therefore,
This implies
Since A 2 tries to bias the output towards 1, we obtain that the statistical distance between the output bit and a uniform random bit is at most
Remark 4.8. Lemma 4.7 also guarantees agreement on the output bit among all the honest miners. Let j denote the distance from the genesis block to B 1 , and consider the event E a {B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n reside in every chain of length j + n + k or more that an honest miner adopts}. According to [27, Theorem 9], we have Pr(E a ) = 1 − e −Ω(k) . Therefore,
. This implies that the output bit of the beacon is publicly verifiable in the following sense: any honest party can verify the validity of some n + k consecutive blocks and compute the bit that the first n blocks derive, and have the assurance that this bit is close to uniform and that w.h.p. every other honest party will derive the same bit.
It should be noted that the hidden constants in the terms e −Ω(k) and e −Ω(δ 2 ℓ) depend on a parameter f that measures the synchronicity of the honest miners, as can be seen by inspecting [27, Theorem 9] and [27, Theorem 10] . However, with 10 minutes average block interval as in Bitcoin, and reasonable assumptions on the network propagation latency [22] , the probability of forks by the honest miners is less than 3%, and therefore the constant f is quite modest. Observation 4.9. We may suppose w.l.o.g. that A 2 ceaselessly tries to create blocks for as long as she is not bankrupt, since an adversary A 0 who opts to remain idle (instead of submitting queries to the random oracle at some rounds of the backbone protocol execution) gains nothing by doing so. This is because the majority function is influenced only by the total amount of blocks that A 0 contributes among the n blocks, and therefore it is better to create the blocks as soon as possible. Hence, A 2 is at least as powerful w.r.t. influencing the output bit of π beacon as A 0 is.
13
The above observation leads us to the following interpretation.
Interpretation 4.10. Consider the adversary A 2 of Lemma 4.7. Suppose that every block B that A 2 creates such that B will be included in every chain of every honest party from a certain round, A 2 earns x coins. Suppose that for every block that will be included in every chain of every honest miner from a certain round, A 2 loses either y(β) or more coins. Because Observation 4.9 allows us to assume that A 2 attempts to create every block, y(β) represents the operating expenses of A 2 for each block that she either succeeded or failed to create, and x represents the reward that A 2 earns for a block that she successfully created. For β = β ′ N qT /2 κ , denote z β β ′ x − y(β). The quantity z β can be regarded as an upper bound on the "honest" profit margin of A 2 per block, i.e., it is an approximation of the profit margin that A 2 can initially expect in case she extends only the head of the chain. It is therefore reasonable to assume that z β > 0. Denote w β 3 )x−y(β). As implied by [27, Theorem 10] , the quantity w β can be viewed as an upper bound on profit margin of A while she deploys any adversarial strategy but discards half of the blocks that she creates. Hence, in case A 2 has an initial reserve of R coins but she was only able to create at most ℓ of the first L blocks in π beacon , she would be left with a supply of
1 λ ′ w β or less coins. Suppose that z β is small enough so that w β < 0. Suppose that ℓ is large enough so that R + ℓ(1 − δ 3 ) 1 λ ′ w β < 0 holds. We can now see that the formal bankruptcy event coincides with the interpretation that A 2 depleted her entire initial budget of R coins. Specifically, using the denotations of Lemma 4.7, the occurrence of E q ∩ E c is interpreted to mean that A 2 ran out of coins while trying to contribute as many blocks as possible among the first L blocks. This is because E c implies that all honest miners would agree that the only coins that A 2 earned are these ≤ ℓx coin rewards, and thus A 2 would have no other coins of value.
For instance, consider δ = 1 100 , β = N /5 · qT /2 κ , λ = 3.9, and let us suppose that A 2 can deploy a strategy that enables her to earn up to x − y(β) at the most, for any adversarial strategy that she deploys. At this point, let us consider the broader range of adversaries. The next remark will come useful in the analysis that follows it. Remark 4.11. A closer examination of [27, Theorem 10] reveals that the mining power of A 2 will allow her to create a supply of ℓ ′ blocks such that she will be able to include either all of these ℓ ′ blocks or less in a chain that consists of L = (1 − δ 3 ) −1 λℓ consecutive blocks in total, and the probability that the size of this supply satisfies ℓ ′ > ℓ is e −Ω(δ 2 L) , and hence also e −Ω(δ 2 ℓ) at the most 1 . Therefore, we can regard A 2 as an even more powerful adversary who operates in two phases. In the first phase, A 2 creates a private chain C that starts from the genesis block, by submitting queries to the random oracle. Then, at whichever round that A 2 desires, she switches to the second phase, where she picks any chain C ′ of an honest party, and is then granted the unusual power of being able to instantly find a nonce that modifies the second block of C so that it would extend the last block of C ′ rather than the genesis block. Then, A 2 broadcasts the valid chain C ′ → C, and from then on she may only extend chains that include C.
We are now ready to show that Lemma 4.7 together with Assumption 4.1 guarantee that when n is large enough, any budget-restricted adversary will fail to influence the beacon. Keep in mind that this requires a realistic profits bound, otherwise the lower bound of Section 3 would apply (as illustrated in Example 4.13).
Interpretation 4.12. Consider an adversary A 3 who may deploy any possible strategy, which implies that she may publish "detrimental" blocks. Suppose that the mining power of A 3 is also β, and that she purchased this mining power with R 1 coins. Suppose that A 3 has an additional reserve of R 2 coins. For the parameter n that π beacon is invoked with, suppose that the adversary A 2 has a reserve of R 2 + maxprofits(R 1 , n) coins. Following Interpretation 4.10, let us note that we expect z β to diminish over time, as can be inferred by Assumption 4.1. One way to think of it is that y(β) grows because A 2 needs to keep expending more resources in order to maintain β level of mining power relative to the honest miners, by buying new mining equipment and repairing old equipment. Let us assume that n 0 and ℓ 0 ⌊ ǫ 2 π e n 0 − √ n 0 ⌋ are large enough so that the condition R 2 + maxprofits(
λ ′ w β < 0 holds. The adversary A 3 may opt to include "detrimental" blocks that she created and increase her coins reserve this way, thereby allowing her to carry on playing before she runs out of coins, albeit at the cost of influencing the beacon in the wrong direction. However, according to Assumption 4.1, the maximal amount of coins that A 3 can earn is maxprofits(R 1 , n 0 ). In view of Remark 4.11, we can regard A 2 as building one secretive private chain. This means that it is never beneficial for A 2 to broadcast a shorter chain that includes "detrimental" blocks that she solved in order to win an intermediate race against the honest miners. Therefore, the only possible advantage that A 2 would have had if she was capable of including "detrimental" blocks in her chain is the ability to earn extra revenues in order to avoid going under budget. Since the initial budget of A 2 has maxprofits(R 1 , n 0 ) more coins than the initial budget of A 3 , it follows that although A 2 must discard all of her "detrimental" blocks, it is less probable that she will run out of coins before A 3 runs out of coins, than vice verse. Thus, it is more likely than not that A 2 will contribute at least the same amount of "helpful" blocks as A 3 contributes. Since A 2 achieves a bias of
at the most, it thus follows that the bias that A 3 achieves is also ǫ + Pr(E b ∩ ¬E ℓ ) + (Ω( √ n)) −1 + e −Ω(δ 2 ℓ) + e −Ω(k) or less. Let us draw attention to the facts that A 2 goes bankrupt except with negligible probability, while A 3 does not necessarily go bankrupt. Yet, we have that both A 2 and A 3 are destined to fail in their attempt to influence the output bit of π beacon , unless they can continue to operate after they become bankrupt.
Hence, Interpretation 4.12 demonstrates that for any adversary A with an arbitrary initial budget, we can set n and k to be large enough so that the bias of the beacon is arbitrarily small. Concretely, to achieve bias of at most ǫ, Lemma 4.7 requires e −Ω(δ 2 ℓ) ≤ ǫ for ℓ = ⌊ ǫ ) blocks are enough, unless the budget and profits of A are large enough so that R 2 + maxprofits(
Interpretation 4.12 does not imply that an arbitrarily small ǫ bias can be achieved. However, per Section 4.1, it is reasonable to assume that maxprofits(R 1 , n) ≤ 2R 1 .
Let us note that Observation 4.9 should hold even in more complex models. For instance, it would hold in a model in which an adversary A can gain a windfall of coins due to an external event that occurs with some likelihood. This is because of Remark 4.11 and the fact that the majority extractor is influenced only by the total amount of locations that A controls, which together imply that A can play until she runs out of coins and then wait for the external event to occur and thereby negate her bankruptcy. Furthermore, z β > 0 also implies that Observation 4.9 would hold in complex models.
A superficial review of Lemma 4.7 may lead one to believe that the assumption that the adversary has less than 1 2 of the mining power is inessential. While the constraint γ = λ(1 + δ)β is required in order to invoke [27, Theorem 9] and [27, Theorem 10] , the transformation from λ to λ ′ = 2λ may seem to imply that an adversary with mining power β ≈ 2 /3 · N qT /2 κ can also be coped with. However, let us show that Assumption 4.1 may no longer make sense under these conditions. Let
3 . An adversary A 4 with mining power β = β ′ N qT /2 κ succeeds with probability 1 to create a private longest chain, by winning the race against the honest miners [46, 41] . This longest chain can be arbitrarily large, and it consist of blocks that only A 4 contributed. Note that A 4 would not discard any of the blocks that she creates while working on this private chain. Hence, following Interpretation 4.10, A 4 collects a reward of x coins per each of the blocks in this private chain. Although the honest profit margin is z β = β ′ x − y(β), these observations imply that the effective profit margin of A 4 reaches x − y(β) when she mounts an attack. Suppose that A 4 acquired her β mining power with t coins. If Assumption 4.1 entails that maxprofits(t, n) = O(t) even in the case that A 4 collects all of the block rewards, then Interpretation 4.12 still holds. On the other hand, if we make the plausible assumption that every block costs A 4 at most x − c coins to produce, where c is a constant, then Example 4.13 demonstrates that A 4 can defeat π beacon . Overall, it may indeed be true that an adversary with up to ≈ 2 /3 of the mining power is still weak enough in a practical setting (cf. Section 4.1), but such an adversary is likely to be too powerful when π beacon is invoked with a sufficiently large n.
As a side note, let us remark that a similar reasoning to the above shows that an adversary A 5 who operates in the Bitcoin backbone model with an infinite budget and more than 1 /2 of the mining power can bias the output bit by the largest possible amount (i.e., a larger bias than that of the adversary in Section 3). The adversary A 5 can create her own private chain that has at least n + k blocks and is longer than the chains that the honest parties have, and publish it only in case it derives the desired output bit for the beacon. This event happens with probability 1 /2, because A 5 succeeds to create the longest chain with probability 1. Otherwise, A 5 discards her chain, and proceeds to create a fresh longest chain that starts from where the discarded chain started. Even though it should take A 5 much longer to create the second chain, she still succeeds with probability 1, and therefore succeeds to obtain the desired beacon output with probability 1 /2. Otherwise, she discards her chain again, and repeats the process. Hence, overall, A 5 succeeds to set the beacon to the output that she desires with probability While Lemma 4.7 and Interpretation 4.12 establish that π beacon is secure against any adversarial strategy, it can be useful to consider practical strategies that an adversary may use. In a usual setting, selfish mining strategies [25, 4, 48] may become profitable only after at least one difficulty readjustment occurs (in Bitcoin this happens after a 2016 blocks window that takes ≈ 2 weeks). This is because a selfish miner would have had less orphaned blocks if she dedicated her entire mining power to generating blocks at the head of the honest chain. However, when the goal of the adversary is to influence the beacon rather than to earn revenues, a selfish mining strategy can be effective even before a difficulty readjustment occurs, because the proportional amount of blocks that the adversary contributes relative to the honest miners will already be larger. That being said, our utilization of the extraordinary adversary that is described in Remark 4.11 was only for the purpose of the analysis, and in reality an adversary with less than 1 /2 of the mining power cannot sustain a private chain for long. Thus, when considering an adversary with β mining power and γ = λ(1 + δ)β, λ ≥ 1 as in Lemma 4.7, it is unlikely that this adversary can create 1 /λ portion of the blocks. To give a concrete example, the basic selfish mining strategy of [25] implies that an adversary with 1 /3 of the mining power and no connectivity advantage can create 38.4% of the blocks.
Discussion of mining profitability
Since the market entry costs for Bitcoin mining are low, the expected profit margin cannot be high. The reason for this is that if anyone could purchase a Bitcoin mining machine that creates money ad infinitum, then everyone would become a Bitcoin miner. Actually, it is also unreasonable to assume that Bitcoin mining is necessarily risk-free, as in reality it is in fact unprofitable to be a Bitcoin miner sometimes (see [51, 21, 38, 42, 26] for some analysis and examples).
Hence, an unexcessive growth rate for maxprofits(t, n) that satisfies ∀n : maxprofits(t, n) ≤ 2t is more than reasonable, as most miners would be quite happy to double the return on their investment. Of course, our analysis can also accommodate a more lucrative bound, for example ∀n : maxprofits(t, n) ≤ 100t. In fact, Interpretation 4.12 shows that our analysis holds for maxprofits(t, n) = o( √ n), though it is more natural to assume that the profits bound is a function of t.
The economic reasoning can also be elaborated upon as follows. Suppose that Alice buy a citrus juicer and starts a lemonade stand. The price at which Alice buys lemons is lower than the price at which she sells the lemonade, hence Alice makes a profit with each sale. While Alice's initial investment in the citrus juicer enables her to continuously accumulate profits, we do not expect Alice to become a billionaire as a result of this process. Our pessimistic prediction stems from the observations that the citrus juicer erodes over time, that Alice's profit margin is unlikely to be excessive, and that Alice's wealth will be measured relative to her competitors rather than in absolute terms. If Alice decides to drop the lemonade business and become a Bitcoin miner instead, the same reasoning still applies.
Hence, even if a Bitcoin miner re-invests some of her profits by buying additional mining equipment, we can expect this process to converge towards some bound on the overall amount of profits. While Lemma 4.7 assumes that the adversary's mining power β is constant, we can instead interpret β as the maximal mining power that the adversary can obtain as a result of the re-investments process.
To take some exemplary figures, a miner may have an average cost of at least 98 coins in terms of power consumption mining equipment erosion until she succeeds to solve a block, and the reward that she earns from each solved block is 100 coins on average. If we examine Lemma 4.3, we see that for increasingly greater values of n it is indeed the case that d can be larger while still satisfying the inequality δ 1 p ′ ℓ ≤ n − d. However, the gains that the adversary achieves with a large d can be disregarded due to Assumption 4.1. This can be thought of as quite reasonable since the profit margin is modest (100 − 98 = 2 or less coins profit per solved block), as opposed to mining at a loss by discarding half of the solved blocks, which will lead to a quick deterioration of funds (a loss of 50 − 98 = −48 coins per solved block). This can be taken to mean that the adversary does not earn a substantial enough amount of coins by including many "detrimental" blocks before the n blocks that the beacon utilizes are created. Thus, in a practical setting, it is likely that the adversary A 2 of Interpretation 4.10 is already as powerful as the general adversary A 3 of Interpretation 4.12.
Let us provide a counterexample that shows that an unreasonable profits structure implies that the adversary is powerful enough to defeat any beacon protocol.
Example 4.13. Consider an unrealistic setting where the adversary's profit margin per block is constant during any arbitrarily long period of time. Hence, in particular, a condition of the form ∃c ∀n : maxprofits(t, n) ≤ c · t does not hold. In this setting, it is impossible to have a beacon that outputs a bit whose statistical distance from uniform is arbitrarily close to 0, even in the forkless model M FL , and even if the adversary has a finite budget that prevents her from operating at a loss indefinitely. To see this, suppose for example that the reward per block is x = 60 coins, the adversary has p = 1 /10 of the mining power, and attempting to produce each block costs the adversary y p = 5 coins. Thus, the profit margin is z p = 60 · 1 /10 − 5 = 1 coin per block. On the other hand, operating at a loss by discarding all "detrimental" blocks implies that the adversary has a cost of w p = 60 · 1 /19 − 5 > 60 · 1 /20 − 5 = −2 coins per block on average. Therefore, one straightforward strategy for the adversary in this case is to operate honestly during the first n /2 blocks, and discard all of her "detrimental" blocks in the next n /4 blocks. Since w > −2z, w.h.p. the adversary will earn enough coins during the first n /2 blocks so that she would not run out of funds while operating at a loss in the following n /4 blocks. The beacon protocol should thus be secure against a non-oblivious symbol-fixing source that controls ≈ n /40 of the locations. However, our lower bound in Section 3 shows that an adversary who controls a constant fraction p = 1 /40 of the locations can bias the output bit of the beacon by at least an 1 /6 · p = 1 /240 amount.
In fact, the above example implies that any constant production cost y p and positive profit margin z p make it impossible to achieve an arbitrarily small bias. In the real world it may be possible to have an investment that generates constant profits in nominal terms, though one should factor inflation-adjusted prices in that case.
Hybrid protocol
We now consider a protocol that combines reliance on designated parties and randomness extraction from the Bitcoin public ledger. In this setting, the designated parties are hopefully reputable and honest, and thus the goal is to have a protocol that makes use of the designated parties in order to output a bit that has even less bias when compared to the π beacon protocol.
An ideal objective for a hybrid protocol is of the following form:
• If the number of designated parties who are honest is above some threshold, then the output bit has less bias than that of π beacon .
• Otherwise, the bias of the output bit is not worse than that of π beacon .
Unfortunately, this objective is bound to fail, barring additional assumptions. To see that, consider for example an adversary who corrupts all of the designated parties. If this adversary has β mining power, then she should get some advantage relative to an adversary with β mining power who tries to defeat π beacon , because the hybrid protocol takes into account the actions of the designated parties. Thus, we present a protocol that does not necessarily accomplish the ideal goal.
In a similar fashion to other blockchain-based protocols that impose fairness [3, 12, 36, 34, 35] , our hybrid protocol makes use of a commitment with penalty functionality F ⋆ com . The F ⋆ com functionality allows a party P i to lock q coins of hers, so that she can take back possession of these q coins if and only if she reveals a certain decommitment before a time limit τ . In case the limit τ passed and P i did not reveal the decommitment, the q coins are destroyed. Due to the OP CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY [49] softfork, the F ⋆ com functionality can be realized in Bitcoin in a straightforward manner. See Code 1 for a high-level pseudocode of F ⋆ com , and Code 2 for the actual Bitcoin script that corresponds to it.
The hybrid protocol is presented in Figure 3 . The index u 1 specifies an agreed upon starting block B u 1 . As we discuss below, a sensible choice for the function f can be f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) = majority(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) or f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) = x 1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x m . The parameter t specifies a return False ⊲ the q coins are unspendable 3: else
4:
P i can spend the q coins by 5: signing with sk i ⊲ the public key pk i of P i is hardcoded segment length in which each designated party P i ∈ {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m } is required to react, as otherwise P i is regarded as a corrupt party who aborted. The purpose of the parameter k is to handle the possible re-organizations of the chain history by ensuring w.h.p. an agreement on a common prefix among the honest miners, in the beacon phase as well as in the commitments/decommitments phases.
Let us examine the case of r = 1 and f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) = majority(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) first. Suppose for the moment that the adversary A hyb does not possess any mining power. Suppose that m is odd, and denote h m+1 2 . In case A hyb corrupts a minimal majority of the parties, say P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P h , she can choose
in the commitments phase. Then, A hyb will inspect the bit b that was derived in beacon phase, and will either decommit all of the bits d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d h so that the output will be b ⊕ 1, or withhold h ′ of the h bits to cause the output to be b at the cost of losing h ′ · q coins. We thus see that when A hyb corrupts a majority of the designated parties, she has complete control over the output. Note that 1 ≤ h ′ ≤ h, with h ′ = 1 in the case that all of the m − h honest parties committed to 0, and h ′ = h in the case that all of the m − h honest parties committed to 1. Since the probability that A hyb would wish to flip b is 1 /2, it follows that A hyb has to pay a penalty of more than 1 2 q coins in expectation. By contrast, consider a protocol that consists of only the first and third phases, i.e., without employing the beacon as the intermediate phase. An adversary who corrupts the majority of the designated parties has complete control over the output, without paying any penalty. This is because the adversary can simply commit to the output bit that she desires.
The above observations imply that when A hyb corrupts at least one (and at most h) of the designated parties, she can then either
• Expend resources during the beacon phase in an attempt to influence b to be the opposite of her desired output, thus making it less likely that she will need to withhold some of her decommitments and lose q or more coins.
• Or, remain idle during the beacon phase, and lose at least q coins in case she wishes to flip b during the decommitments phase.
By assuming that A hyb corrupts a minority of the designated parties, we can make the following claim. ⋆ If P i did not forfeit prior to round j, and posted her decommitment coins, and has an additional reserve of R 2 coins. Assume that the following conditions hold:
1. R 2 + maxprofits(R 1 , n + 2t + 3k) < q. Then, the output of π hyb is less biased than the output of π beacon .
Proof. The first condition implies that A hyb does not have enough funds to withhold any decommitment, unless she goes under budget. Therefore, the second condition implies that A hyb can influence the output only during the beacon phase. However, the third condition implies that A hyb will have an uncertainty regarding the direction in which to influence the beacon, because the output may or may not become flipped when the other m − m ′ designated parties reveal their input bits in the decommitments phase.
Let us now consider r = 1 and f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) = x 1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x m . If at least one of the designated parties is honest, then it is useless for A hyb to try to influence the beacon phase, and instead she must lose the q coins penalty if she wishes to influence the output bit. Thus, A hyb may be a more powerful adversary in the case of f = majority, as then the mining power of A hyb can be effective even if she does not corrupt all of the designated parties. On the other hand, when f = majority and A hyb corrupts only one designated party, she may fail to influence the output if she withholds the decommitment. Hence, f = majority and f = xor are a priori incomparable. Under the reasonable assumption that the cost of influencing the beacon is high, it should be better to use f = majority in order to make it difficult for A hyb to influence f . In the case that the cost of influencing the beacon is low, it might be better to use f = xor in order to make it less likely that the distribution of the output bit is affected by the beacon phase (this can happen only if A hyb corrupts all the designated parties).
Let us also consider the case of incorporating more rounds in π hyb .
Claim 5.2. Suppose that π hyb is parameterized according to an odd r > 1 and f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) = x 1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x m . Suppose that the adversary A hyb purchased her mining power with R 1 coins, and has an additional reserve of R 2 coins. Let ǫ > 0 be arbitrary. Denote ℓ ⌊2ǫ π e r − √ r⌋−1.
Assume that the following conditions hold:
1. R 2 + maxprofits(R 1 , r(n + 2t + 3k)) ≤ ℓq.
2.
A hyb does not go under budget.
3.
A hyb corrupts m ′ ≤ m − 1 of the designated parties.
Then, the protocol π hyb outputs a bit whose statistical distance from a uniform random bit is at most ǫ.
Proof. The third condition implies that A hyb must lose q coins for every round that she wishes to control. Hence, the first and second conditions imply that A hyb would not have enough funds to control more than ℓ rounds by the time that the protocol terminated. We can thus regard A hyb as having ℓ ′ ≤ ℓ locations that she controls, and the remaining r − ℓ ′ locations are uniform random. While the majority extractor is an ǫ-extractor for (r, r − ℓ) non-oblivious bit-fixing source, an inspection of Lemma 2.3 shows that the same holds even in the case of a somewhat more powerful adversary. This adversary is a a quota of ℓ locations, and upon seeing the inputs x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x i−1 the adversary is allowed to decide whether to take control over x i by decrementing her quota, or let x i be sampled as a uniform random bit. The relevant observation is that the event E in Lemma 2.3 has the same meaning both in the case of an adversary that plays at ℓ locations that are fixed in advance, and an adversary who chooses adaptively the location in which she plays. It therefore follows that the statistical distance between the output bit and a uniform random bit is ǫ or less.
As discussed above, the only reason for employing the beacon when π hyb is parameterized according to f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) = x 1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x m is to handle the possibility that the adversary A hyb corrupts all the designated parties.
Let us note that under the assumption that A hyb is able to corrupt significantly less than half of the designated parties, the hybrid protocol π hyb can be improved by replacing f with the iterated majority extractor [9, 33] . Specifically, when the number of non-random inputs is ≈ m 0.63 or less, the iterated majority extractor is strictly better than the majority extractor. For example, if A hyb corrupts one of m = 9 designated parties, she will have ( 
Practical considerations
For a beacon protocol that is dependent upon Bitcoin or similar systems, the real-world aspects of proof of work (PoW) based cryptocurrencies present some additional security concerns, as well as certain beneficial factors.
First, let us consider the additional potential risks. Our analysis assumed an adversary with β mining power, such that the performance of the π beacon protocol is better when β is smaller. However, in the real world, Bitcoin miners delegate their power to centralized pools. We can thus regard the pool administrator as the adversary, as is it abnormal for a single pool to hold more than 1 2 of the mining power. Moreover, the risk that an adversarial pool administrator (with a large β) poses is less profound than what one may think. The reason for that is that the pool administrator can influence π beacon only by discarding "detrimental" blocks (cf. Definition 4.2) that are solved by the miners who delegate their power to the pool. When the miners who participate in the pool would notice that their solved blocks are not being used and thus the rewards are not being added to the pool's reserve, they are likely to switch to a competing pool.
On the other hand, the real-world behavior of the miners of crytocurrencies provides opportunities to strengthen the security of a beacon protocol. Since there are multiple cryptocurrency systems that enjoy some level of popularity, and these systems are based on different PoW hash functions, the beacon protocol can amplify its security by relying on multiple blockchains. The benefit in this stems from the observation that an adversary A who wishes to influence the beacon output would need invest in different kinds of mining equipment (or bribe the miners of different systems). That is, the amount of popularity that various cryptocurrency systems have can be harnessed to increase the overall security level of the beacon protocol. For example, let us make the following suppositions with regard to Bitcoin and Litecoin [37] :
1. Both Bitcoin and Litecoin have a similar market entry cost, implying that the profit margin for either of them is low.
2. The purchasing power of the Bitcoin currency is c 1 times greater than that of the Litecoin currency, where c 1 ≥ 1 because Bitcoin enjoys a greater level of adoption among the population.
3. The level of PoW based security that Bitcoin has is c 2 times greater than that of Litecoin, where c 2 ≥ 1 because Bitcoin is more popular and thus more miners have a vested interest to keep it secure.
Notice that if A needs to invest t coins to acquire p < 1 of the Bitcoin mining power, then the third supposition implies that A obtains ≈ c 2 · p of the Litecoin mining power by investing t coins into Litecoin mining equipment. Also note that c 1 = c 2 is possible at least over the short term, though it is reasonable to assume that the adoption level would drive the security level over the long term. Let x denote the value of each Bitcoin block reward. Due to our second supposition, the value of each Litecoin block reward is x /c 1 . The adversary A is expected to solve p · m Bitcoin blocks, and thus lose ≈ x· pm 2 in value as she tries to influence the output bit. Also, A is expected to solve c 2 · p · w Litecoin blocks, and thus lose ≈ m implies that it is about as costly for A to influence the Bitcoin portion and the Litecoin portion of the inputs to the majority function. E.g., if the price of Litecoin is 100 times smaller than that of Bitcoin, and the security of the Litecoin network is 50 times smaller than that of Bitcoin, then w = 2m is a rational choice.
The running time of this protocol is comparable to π beacon with n = m + w /4, because the blocks interval of Litecoin blocks is 4 times shorter than that of Bitcoin. Hence, the advantage of this beacon protocol over π beacon is that A invested 2t coins to try to influence the m + w blocks, while she would have needed to invest only t coins to try to influence m + w /4 Bitcoin blocks. Furthermore, the need to acquire different kinds of mining equipment (SHA256 ASIC for Bitcoin and scrypt ASIC for Litecoin) makes the task of the adversary more demanding.
